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CURRENT DECISIONS
Constitutional Law-THE POLL TAX. In Harper v. Virginia State
Board of Elections,' the petitioners questioned the constitutional validity
of Virginia's poll tax.2 The case had been dismissed by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia3 and on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court, the poll tax was declared unconstitutional as
inconsistent with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court stated that once the right to vote is granted to the elec-
torate: 1) lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the equal
protection clause; 2) the poll tax is a form of discrimination; and 3)
wealth or affluence as a prerequisite for voting is invidious discrimina-
tion and the opportunity for equal participation by all voters is required.
The controversy concerning the poll tax has stemmed from the chang-
ing interpretation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court in Breedlove v. Suttles5 said that there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in reference to Georgia's poll
tax and stated that the equal protection clause did not require absolute
equality. 6 States may condition suffrage as they deem appropriate. 7
1. 86 S.Ct. 1079 (1966). The petitioners, four residents of Virginia, sought leave of
the court to prosecute the action in forma pauperis alleging that they and members of
their class were unable to pay the poll tax and were thus prevented from registering
to vote, and from voting in non-federal elections solely because of their poverty.
2. CoNssT. oF VA., Sec. 18 (1950).
Every citizen of the United States, twenty-one years of age, who has been a
resident of the State one year, of the county, city or town six months, and of
the precinct in which he offers to vote, thirty days next preceding the election
in which he offers to vote, has been registered, and has paid his State poll taxes,
as hereinafter required, shall be entitled to vote ....
3. 240 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Va. 1964). The case was dismissed on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because payment
of a poll tax was not open to question by reason of the Court in Breedlove v. Suttles,
302 U.S. 277. With regard to the pauper disqualification, the court noted that there had
been no showing that either appellants or members of their class had been prevented
from voting on that ground and concluded that "an expression by us on the meaning
and the implications of that term would be entirely academic and without place here."
4. Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, supra 1 at 1081.
5. 302 U.S. 277 (1937). The poll tax was attacked because it discriminated against a
certain class of individuals insofar as the tax extended to persons between the ages of
21 and 60.
6. Id., at 283. The Court stated that absolute equality would have the poll tax extend
to everyone including the blind and the aged which would result in a harsh and unjust
rule.
7. See Breedlove v. Suttles, supra note 5 at 283 ("reasonable" conditions were under-
stood).
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The Court stated that payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting
is not a denial of any privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment because the privilege of voting is not derived from the
United States, but is reserved to the states, except as regulated by the
Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments." The equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment merely necessitates equality of those whom
the state deems qualified to vote.
The Court in a later decision indorsed North Carolina's desire to
promote intelligent use of the ballot.9 It was decided that a state may,
consistent with the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments,, apply a
literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or color. The equal protec-
tion clause was not impinged because a state's insistence on intelligent
use of the ballot, or any other intelligent use of a constitutional right,
cannot constitute discrimination as to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."1
The rationale of the Court in Carrington v. Rash12 extended the ap-
proach of "reasonableness" as expounded in Lassiter and distinguished the
Breedlove case. The latter case would condone a broad statute which
applied equally to a whole class of persons, while the Carrington case
refused to sanction a statute which denied the ballot because the in-
dividual was a member of a certain class. The Court, inadvertently
adopting the approach of Lassiter, said that a state could impose reason-
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account or race, color, or previous con-
dition of servitude.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIX, § 1.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
9. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
10. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV, Sec. 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVII.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have
one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
11. Supra note 9 at 47.
12. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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able residence requirements for voting but it could not, because of the
equal protection clause, deny the ballot to a bona fide resident merely
because he was a member of the armed services. 13
While a case to case analysis vaguely differentiates the change of
emphasis the Court has given to the Fourteenth Amendment, the con-
trast becomes more definitive when two cases, diverse in point of time,
are compared. In Pope v. Williams, 4 the Court based their decision
on the then well-accepted theory that the privilege to vote, regardless of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is not granted
by the Constitution or by any of its Amendments. It is not a privilege
springing from United States citizenship, but a right reserved to the
states.' However, the more recent case of Reynolds v. Simms,", held
that the Federal Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment "re-
quires" the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the
election of state legislatures.17
Harper breaks with the traditional test of the constitutionality of a
state law. This test, evolved by the Supreme Court for determining
whether an "asserted justifying classification" existed, was whether such
a classification could be founded on some rational state policy. 8 The
test reduced the likelihood of federal judges determining state policies
in terms of their individual opinions. The present case is essentially a
colateral application of the rationale of Douglas v. California9 decided
by the Court in 1963. Although the latter was a criminal case and was
decided primarily on the basis of the due process clause, the Court
found that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the proposition that
affluence can be a precondition to the exercise of a constitutional right.
The Court, considering affluence as the deciding issue, held the desti-
13. Id., at 91; The logic of Lassiter v. Northhampton County Board of Elections, 360
U.S. 45, in essence promoted the reasonableness of an intelligent vote or conversely de-
nounced illiteracy among voters. The Court in Carrington v. Rash denounced the ir-
rationality of denying the vote to a person with the stigma of serving with the armed
services. The Supreme Court's reversal of the latter case and affirmance of the former
were examples of the Court's nonreluctance to break with the traditional test for the
constitutionality of a state law.
14. 193 U.S. 621 (1904); accord, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US. 537 (1886).
15. Id., at 622.
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. Id., at 535.
18. McLoughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964); accord, Powell v. Commission
of Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1943).
19. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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tute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as de-
fendants who had funds to have counsel represent them.21
Along the same line, the Court in Griffin v. Illinois,21 held that
transcripts must be provided if necessary to allow for an adequate,
nondiscriminatory appeal. In the situation where an indigent cannot
afford a transcript, they must be provided by the state.22
In effect, the present case overrules the Breedlove decision. The
United States has limited discrimination in "right to vote" cases to
intelligent use of the ballot. While the Court has condoned reasonable
literacy tests by states, invidious discrimination has been dilineated by
the Court in the present case to include affluence as a prerequisite for
voting. The Harper decision, by renouncing a poll tax of one dollar
and fifty cents per year, leaves no room for doubt that the Court will
not tolerate a burden of any sort on the constitutional rights of citizens.
Michael Lesniak
Constitutional Law-STATUTORY INFERENCES OF CRIMINALITY. In
U. S. v. Romano,' the United States Supreme Court held that the statu-
tory inference of guilt drawn from mere presence was insufficient
evidence to convict for possession, custody and control of an illegal
operating still.
On October 13, 1960 Federal ATTU Agents and Connecticut State
Police conducted a raid on an illegal operating still within an industrial
complex in Jewett City, Connecticut. Respondents, Frank Romano and
John Ottiano, who were found standing a few feet from the still when
the officers entered the building, were arrested and charged with pos-
session, custody and control of an illegal still, illegal production of
distilled spirits and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Both were
subsequently tried in the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut and found guilty on all three courts, receiving three
years imprisonment for each offense to run concurrently, and in addition,
20. Id., at 355.
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. Id., at 14.
1. 382 U. S. 136 (1965).
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